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Substantive Due Process Analysis of
Nonlegislative State Action: A Case Studyt
On the evening of October 24, 1976, Barbara McDowell, her
brother Ramon White, and their cousin Cheri Ballanger, all minors, were passengers in an automobile driven by their uncle
Charles DeGeorge. DeGeorge was stopped on the Chicago Skyway by two Chicago police officers, charged with drag racing,
and placed under custodial arrest. Since none of the children
were of age to drive, DeGeorge asked the officers to take them a t
least as far as a telephone booth so that they could contact their
parents. The policemen refused the request, however, and the
children were left in DeGeorge's automobile at the side of the
freeway. After some time, the three decided to leave the car, and
were forced to cross eight lanes of traffic and walk along the
freeway to find a telephone. They contacted Barbara's and Ramon's mother who, unsuccessful in her attempts to enlist assistance from the police department, eventually sent a neighbor to
find them. All three children were ultimately retrieved, but the
cold weather had adversely affected five-year-old Ramon, an
asthmatic, and he was hospitalized for a week following the
incident.
The lawfulness of DeGeorge's arrest was not contested, but
Eugene and Shirley White, parents of Barbara and Ramon,
brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983l in United States
District Court against the two arresting police officers and the
superintendent of police. They claimed that deprivation of their
children's constitutional rights had ultimately led to the children's physical and emotional injury.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a constitutional claim upon
7 White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
1. Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the superintendent of
police, but reversed and remanded to the trial court the claim
against the arresting officers.Vn so ruling, the Seventh Circuit
held that the officers' alleged actions amounted to a deprivation
of constitutional rights actionable under section 1983-specifically, that the children's rights under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment had been breached by the policemen's refusal to lend them aid?

The fourteenth amendment specifically prohibits a state
from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' While it has been observed that the basic
function of due process is to protect individual interests from
arbitrary governmental action,' what actually constitutes a protectible interest under the rubric of "life, liberty, or property,"
and what satisfies the state's obligation to observe "due process
of law" when deprivation of any such interest is in issue, have
proved elusive. Actual definitions of due process and of the interest it protects vary with specific factual context^.^ It is nevertheless clear that, depending on the nature of the challenge, the
guarantee of due process of law may be examined from two different-though not in all respects distinct-perspectives: procedural or substantive.

A. Historical Overview
Literally, the term "due process of law" denotes the proce2. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1979).
3. Id. at 383.
4. US. CONST.amend. XIV, 8 1 (the "due process clause").
5. W O Ev. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
6. Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S.420, 442 (1960).
The Court has said, "[Tlhere is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and
application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require
. . . . " Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). See also Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (state action that "shocks the conscience" violates due process);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (state action that transgresses "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples" is violative of due process guarantees).
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dure that governmental entities or representatives must follow
in dealing with the individual. The drafters of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment intended simply that it provide
assurance that government could act to deprive an individual of
life, liberty, or property only by following proper procedure? For
nearly a hundred years, however, judicial interpretation of the
phrase has not been limited to this literal meaning.
, ~ 1887 case challenging a state proIn Mugler v. K a n ~ a san
hibition of alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court first indicated its willingness to use an expanded due process test to scrutinize the substance of state statutory restrictions, even if
appropriate legislative procedures had been followed in their enactment? Although the particular statute at issue in Mugler was
upheld, the Court's opinion firmed the philosophical foundation
of substantive due process.1° Justice Harlan's majority opinion
stated that a statute must have a real and substantial relation to
the promotion, protection, or preservation of the public health,
safety, or morals to be a legitimate exertion of a state's police
powers and thereby to satisfy due process requirements." This
method of focusing on the content of state regulation was first
used to strike down a state statute in Allgeyer u. Louisiana.12
The Allegeyer Court refined the test suggested in Mugler, how7. J. STORY,COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 1783
(1833). See also Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process,
1830-1860, 40 CAL.L. REV.483, 485-87 (1952).
8. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
9. Use of the due process argument to attack the substance of state regulations was
earlier employed by Justice Bradley, dissenting in the famous Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122 (1873), and concurring in Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111U.S. 746,765 (1884). In neither case, however, did a majority of the Court adopt
Justice Bradley's point of view.
10. This substantive approach was born of a concern that if the sole issue reviewable
by the judiciary was whether state governments followed proper procedures, any law enacted according to the required process would be valid. Consequently, any proceeding
under that law, however arbitrary, would accord with "due process of law." See Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. 123 U.S.at 661. Justice Harlan's opinion was joined by six other members of the
Court. Justice Field filed a separate opinion.
12. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The Court there overturned a Louisiana statute that prohibited any conduct within the state aimed at insuring property with any insurance company not properly licensed to do business in the state.
The constitutional challenge to this limitation on contracting powers was not a procedural one; rather the contention was that a right to contract existed which, though not
specifically mentioned in the fourteenth amendment, was sufliciently tied to the concepts
of liberty and property so as to make the state limitations involved in that case of themselves a deprivation without due process. Id. at 591.
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ever, and it became apparent that the new due process standard
required more of a state than a simple showing of a reasonable
basis for its legislative actions. The Court instead required convincing evidence that the substantive theories underlying the restrictions were valid, i.e., that the statute would actually achieve
the ends sought in its enactment. In Lochner v. New York,lS a
landmark case arising from a due process challenge against a
New York statute prohibiting employment of bakery workers for
more than sixty hours a week, the Court rejected in only a few
words the argument that the law was a valid labor regulation:
"There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours
of labor, in the occupation of a baker. . . . [W]e think that [the
law in question] involves neither the safety, the morals nor the
welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in
the slightest degree affected by the act."14 The Court also rejected the argument that the statute related to public health interests, responding that it was looking for something more than
"mere rationality":
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render
the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation,
as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate
and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his
person and in his power to contract in relation to his own
labor.16

The Court further explained: "There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law . . . ,916
The substantive due process analysis employed by the
Court in Lochner did more than allow the Court to adopt the
posture of a "super legislature," concerned with the wisdom, and
not merely the constitutionality, of particular legislative means
and ends.17 It also expanded the scope of interests considered to

.

13. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. Id. at 57.
15. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 58.
17. It has been observed that later judicial reference to the seminal Allgeyer case
was normally with respect to its "significance in opening the door to substitution of the
Justices' notions of public policy and fundamental values for legislative choices." G.
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be protected by the due process guarantee. For example, due
process "liberty," a concept earlier limited to freedom of movement or absence of physical restraint,18 took on a much broader
meaning under substantive due process and grew to encompass a
broad panoply of "liberties" nowhere explicitly described in the
Constitution.le Perhaps the best description of this expanded
concept is the Court's own statement in Meyer u. N e b r a ~ k a a, ~ ~
case involving a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching
of foreign languages to any child below the eighth grade:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment],
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.%'

Ruling that the "calling of modern language teachers, . . . the
opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and . . .the power
of parents to control the education of their owdn2 were all
within the area of protected liberty, the Court concluded that
"[nlo emergency ha[d] arisen which render[ed] knowledge by a
child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as
GUNTHER,
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW557 (9th ed. 1975). For examples of the Allgeyer-Lochner line of cases, see Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908).
18. 1W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
*130; see Shattuck, The True Meaning of the
Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV.L. REV.365 (1890). The Supreme Court
expressly rejected the limits of this traditional view in Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
19. The history of this expansion is recounted in Warren, The New "Liberty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV.L. REV.431 (1926).
20. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer is historically significant since it is one of two cases
from the Lochner era in which the Court invalidated state regulations based on
noneconomic personal liberties. The other case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.510
(1925), struck down an Oregon law requiring that all children, ages eight through sixteen,
attend public rather than parochial schools. The Court determined that the state's intrusion into recognized areas of personal liberty was without a reasonable basis. Id. at 53435.
21. 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 401.
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to justify its inhibition with a consequent infringement of rights
long freely enj~yed.'~'The Court accordingly held the statute
unconstitutional as being "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.''24
Although the Court's use of this substantive due process approach had significant impact on state legislation during the first
part of this ~entury,'~
its vitality did not endure. In the mid1930's the Court began to abandon its strict scrutiny of economic and social legislation? and this trend continued until
1941 when the Lochner-type approach was expressly repudated.27 Nonetheless, repudiation of Lochner did not effect a
complete burial of the basic concept of substantive due process.

B. A "New" Substantive Approach
The post-1930 withdrawal from strict judicial review of economic regulation was not paralleled by a similar trend in the
area of certain noneconomic personal interests." In fact, the now
23. Id. at 403.
24. Id. For a contrasting case of this era, in which the Court found the deprivation
of recognizable liberty interests justifiable, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905). The plaintiff in that case claimed that the state's compulsory vaccination statute
unconstitutionally deprived him of "the inherent right of every freeman to care for his
own body and health in such a way as to him seems best." Id. at 26. The Court answered
by holding that liberties secured by the Constitution are not entirely immune from restraint and that the dangers of widespread smallpox justified the statute. Id. at 31.
25. Nearly two hundred statutes thought by state legislatures to be wise and necessary fell to the Supreme Court's "judicial veto" during the thirty-year Lochner era. See
MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES
post-1905 cases cited by Justice Frankfurter at F. FRANKFURTER,
AND THE SUPREME
COURT
app. I (1st ed. 1938).
26. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). The shift marked by these cases and others was actually a shift of the
burden of persuasion, rather than of the focus of examination. Analysis remained centered on the balance between state interests and the resulting limitations on individual
interests, but the Court increasingly deferred to the state's own ability to effect this
balance. "With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of
the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. at 537.
27. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (notions of public policy should not be
read into the Constitution in such a manner as to give rise to constitutional restraints on
state legislative action).
28. Meyer and Pierce were never overruled. But see note 41 infra. Using the substantive approach, the court had actually begun incorporation of specific Constitutional
rights into the fourteenth amendment at the height of the Lochner era. See, e.g., Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)' in which the Court first assumed that freedoms of
speech and press under the first amendment were "among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' " protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id.
at 666.
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famous footnote 4 in United States u. Carolene Products2@suggested a double standard of judicial review, under which the Supreme Court would assume a deferential stance in areas of commerical regulation, but would maintain an interventionist stance
in other areas. Justice Stone, the author of the majority opinion,
based this suggestion on a theory that "[tlhere may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the F o ~ r t e e n t h . " ~ ~
This theory has proved to be more than merely a passing
thought. Indeed, one commentator has observed that it has had
a "pervasive influence" on the approaches taken by the Court."
Without referring to a standard of "substantive due process,"s2
the Court has continued to strictly scrutinize legislation that infringes on certain aspects of personal liberty. However, important limitations have attached to this new in-depth review that
distinguish it from the Lochner approach. Whereas the only
practical bounds to judicial intervention in the Allgeyer-Lochner
line of cases may ultimately have been the personal predilections
of the Court at the time,as the Court's "new" substantive approach has become an approach with self-limiting parameters.
Rather than engaging in strict judicial scrutiny in all instances
of legislative infringement of any of the panoply of rights that
were easily interpreted under Lochner as protected liberty interests, the Court has reserved the compelling state interest standard for protection of individual rights either (1) specifically
contained in the language of the Constitution itself or (2) otherwise deemed by the Court to be "funda~nental."~~
Although the
29. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
30. Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added).
31. G. GUNTHER,
supra note 17, at 593.
32. The term "substantive due process" had become synonymous with the Lochner
approach and attending images of judicial rulings on the wisdom, rather than on the
mere constitutional propriety, of certain state activities. One Supreme Court Justice had
in fact critically noted that the Court's substantive approach caused it to act more as a
"super-legislature" than as a judicial body. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S.504,
534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
34. Considerable disagreement has arisen, even among members of the Court, over
whether fourteenth amendment due process limitations on state action encompass only
the guarantees specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, or whether they incorporate
all "fundamental" rights. Justice Black was one in particular who was very much op-
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reserved power to define "fundamental" essentially grants the
judiciary the same unlimited freedom of definition it enjoyed
during the Lochner era, the Court has effectively imposed
bounds on the word's meaning. In addition to the specific guarantees contained in the first eight amendmentsa5the Court has
added as "fundamental" only a limited number of rights which,
though not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, have been
viewed as implied by its protections and therefore tied directly
to it: (1)freedom of ass~ciation:~(2) a right to vote," (3) a right
to interstate travel,'8 and (4) a right to privacy and some freedom of choice in marital,gs sexua1:O and family1 matters.
The threshold examination under the new substantive apposed to a "fundamental rights" test, because of the unlimited power of definition the
Court could exercise in the name of "natural law." See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68-93 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Although the Court has not limited the label "fundamental" to specifics in the Constitution, the runaway definition feared by Justice Black has never materialized. The
commonly applied test of the Court was articulated by Justice Cardozo, who maintained
that even though all guarantees "may have value and importance," only those which are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and therefore fundamental, should be considered a part of due process. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
35. Thus far, the Court has recognized incorporation into the fourteenth amendment of all the first eight amendments except the second and third, the grand jury indictment requirement of the fifth, and the excessive baillfines provisions of the eighth.
For a detailed discussion of this incorporation, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
36. This right has been held to be implied by first amendment guarantees, even
though there is no specific textual reference. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958).
37. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (describing a
right to vote as including a t least the right to participate in elections on an equal basis
with other qualified voters); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (state's durational
residence requirement subject to strict scrutiny as a serious restriction on the fundamental interest in voting and as a burden on the right to travel).
38. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900).
39. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
40. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1976) (right to purchase
contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concept of personal liberty broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.535 (1942) (right not to be deprived of reproductive capability).
41. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). However, it has been noted that had Meyer and Pierce been
decided thirty years later, their holdings would not have been based on a right to freedom in family matters, but "would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of
freedom of expression and conscience . . . derived from explicit guarantees of the First
Amendment against federal encroachment upon freedom of speech and belief." Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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proach thus looks a t the type of personal interest allegedly involved. Only if a "fundamental" interest is affected may the
Court subjectively inquire into the importance of the state's objective and into the necessity of interference with the individual
right as a means of reaching that end.'% In the absence of a "fundamental" interest, presumptively valid state action will generally be upheld if it simply meets the rational basis test."

C. The Procedural Formula
The procedural approach to due process claims actually involves consideration of questions raised by both the substantive
and procedural elements of the due process guarantee. Not only
must it be determined whether asserted individual interests rise
to the level of life, liberty, and property for purposes of the due
process clause, but if a protected interest is implicated, the court
must further decide what process is due:'
i.e., what kinds of
procedural protections are necessary to overcome the constitutional prohibition against deprivation without "due process of
law."
1. What interests are protectible?

Whatever additional definition has attached to due process
liberty, the term describes at least an absence of physical restraint, and few would disagree that, even though this physical
freedom is not absolute, the state is obliged to protect it from
arbitrary intrusion by providing adequate procedural guarantees. The definition of liberty, however, has long exceeded the
word's literal meaning, and the line separating interests protected by due process from those for which no direct constitutional shield exists has not been clearly drawn.
In Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v.
M c E l r ~ ythe
~ ~Supreme Court seemed to suggest a balancing
approach to the protectible interest question, looking to a "determination of the precise nature of the government function in42. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,672 (1977); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.1267
(1975).
45. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action."46 The Court held in McElroy that the due
process clause was not violated by the summary denial to a cafeteria employee of entrance to a restricted military installation
where she had been working. The Court reasoned that the governmental function of managing the internal operation and security of an important military installation4' outweighed the individual's personal interest in working at one isolated and
and on that basis concluded that there were no
specific pla~e,'~
due process requirements of notice and hearing on the specific
grounds for the exclu~ion.~~
This balancing process was used by the trial court in Roth v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges60to hold that a nontenured
university professor had been denied due process when the university failed to notify him of its reasons for not renewing his
original one-year contract. The court reasoned from the McElroy formula that violation of the due process guarantee had occurred simply because the plaintiffs interest in reemployment at
the university outweighed the university's interest in summarily
dismissing him? Roth was granted a partial summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit
~
and clarified
The Supreme Court reversed R ~ t h , 'however,
the balancing test? It admitted that Roth's "re-employment
prospects were of major concern to him-concern which we
surely cannot say was in~ignificant,"~~
and conceded that "a
weighing process has long been a part of any determination of
the form of hearing required in particular situations by procedu46. Id. a t 895.
47. The installation involved was the Naval Gun Factory (later, the Naval Weapons
Plant) in Washington, D.C. The factory engaged in the design, production, and inspection of naval ordinance, including the development of highly classified systems. Id. a t
887.
48. Id. 'at 895-96.
49. Id. a t 894.
50. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). The district court stated that it considered itself bound to apply the
balancing process described in McElroy. Id. at 977.
51. Id. a t 977-79.
. 52. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), reu'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
53. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
54. The Supreme Court had reiterated the balancing approach in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), suggesting that an individual had a right to invoke the due process
requirements any time his "interest in avoiding [grievous] loss outweigh[ed] the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Id. at 263.
55. 408 U.S. at 570.
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ral due process,"66but the Court also made clear that "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest
at stake."67
Turning to the nature of the interest that had allegedly
been deprived in Roth, the Court noted that "while the Court
has eschewed rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of
procedural due process, it has at the same time observed certain
boundaries. For the words 'liberty' and 'property' in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be given
some meaning."" Because the threshold requirement of deprivathere was
tion of a protectible interest had not been sati~fied,"~
no need to determine, by balancing or by any other means,
whether a particular form of process was due.
In Paul v. Davis," the Supreme Court further narrowed the
scope of interests requiring due process protection. The issue in
Paul centered on police circulation among merchants of a list of
"active shoplifters," which included the petitioner's name and
photograph. The petitioner claimed that failure to give him notice and to provide him an opportunity for a hearing before the
"defamatory" circular was distributed had deprived.him of liberty and property without due process,dl and he sought damages
therefor under section 1983.
Consistent with its approach in Roth, the Court began its
analysis in Paul by considering the nature of the interest involved. It ruled that an interest in one's reputation, affected by
defamation alone, was insufficient to merit due process protec56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 572.
59. Specifically, "[tlhe State, in declining to rehire [the professor], did not make any
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community." Id. at 573. Nor did the state impose upon him any "other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Id. The Court
concluded that it stretches the concept of due process protectible liberty too far "to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but
remains as free as before to seek another." Id. at 575.
In a companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court
assured that due process is violated if a public employee is discharged for reasons that
would violate specific constitutional guarantees, such as freedom of speech. Id. a t 597.
This principle remains constant. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976).
60. 424 U.S.693 (1976).
61. Petitioner had been arrested on shoplifting charges that were not dismissed until after the flyer had been circulated. Id. a t 696.
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tion, reasoning (1)that the respondent had "pointed to no specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest he assert[ed] ha[d] been invaded,"62 and (2) that there is no
independent fourteenth amendment right to be free of injury
wherever the State may be characterized as the tort-feasor."
The Court also answered a separate claim of deprivation of the
right of privacy by holding that the alleged interests fell within
none of the areas recognized as " 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in
the concept of ordered 1ibert~"~-areas specifically limited to
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and edu~ation."~~
The language of the Paul opinion seemed to sharply limit
the application of the due process guarantee by restricting the
scope of protectible liberty to fundamental^."^^ Yet in a subsequent case, Ingraham u. Wright," the Court admitted that the
actual contours of the "historic liberty interest9'-an interest
which, it noted, included the right "generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men9'-have yet to be precisely defined.68
Even if actual attempts to attach some bounds to the meaning of due process liberty have appeared confusing at times, the
Court's underlying concern for some reasonable limits to the due
process guarantee is unmistakable. And in this context it is clear
that identification of an effect on a recognized and protected interest or right is necessary as a minimum in every instance
before a due process requirement arises under the fourteenth
amendment.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Id. a t 701.The Court indicated that to allow such an interpretation would make
the fourteenth amendment "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the State," and that, since recognized "constitutional shoals" confront any attempt to derive from even congressional civil rights statutes a body of general tort law, "a fortiori, the procedural guarantees of the Due Process
Clause cannot be the source of such law." Id.
64. Id. at 713 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US. 319,325 (1937)).
65. 424 U.S. at 713.
66. The Court seemed to limit the scope of due process liberty (beyond the foundational freedom from physical restraint) to specific constitutional guarantees, fundamental areas of privacy, and state-conferred status.
67. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
68. Id. a t 673 (quoting from the broad definition of liberty offered in Meyer u. Nebraska. 262 U.S. at 399).
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2. What process is due?
While specific procedural guarantees relating to criminal
proceedings and attending effects on physical liberty have been
outlined by the Supreme Court:@ the protections which must attend other types of governmental action affecting liberty or
property vary with each fact situation.70Beneath the variations,
however, the due process foundation is the same and requires
that the individual affected by governmental action be given an
oportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."71 The particular safeguards required by the facts of
an individual case are determined most commonly by balancing
three factors:
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'=

Basic procedural fairness to the individual under this and
similar analysis has in some cases required that government provide individuals a fair notice of planned action and an opportunity for some sort of hearing before infringing personal rights.7s
Nevertheless, prior hearings have not been required in every instance. The Court has held that due process is satisfied in some
cases by hearings provided after the government has acted, or
by other adequate procedural safeg~ards.~'
In Ingraham v. Wright,16for example, the Supreme Court
reviewed a charge that children subjected to corporal punishment by school officials were deprived of due process when not
69. See notes 34, 35 and accompanying text supra.
70. " ' "[Dlue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.' " Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. at
162-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); "[Dlue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972).
71. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
72. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
74. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
75. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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granted prior hearings to establish cause. The Court ruled that
affected liberty interests were so protected by common law tort
remedies that additional administrative safeguards, including a
prior hearing, were not required to satisfy due process.76Even
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that "the wording of the command that there shall be no deprivation 'without' due process of
law is consistent with the conclusion that a postdeprivation remedy is sometimes constitutionally ~ufficient."~~

D. Summary
The due process approach taken in a particular case depends primarily on the type of action challenged. The substantive approach was created for review of legislation or legislativetype activity. The Supreme Court has curbed its energies of the
Lochner era and in general has allowed great deference to the
judgment of state officers, requiring only that the legislation or
regulation in issue relate in some reasonable manner to a legitimate governmental end. However, instances of legislative regulation or infringement of rights that the Court has labeled "fundamental" still trigger a more searching judicial examination-one
not of legitimacy alone, but of compelling state interest for the
action-and commonly are held to violate the Constitution.
By contrast, the procedural guarantees of due process are
governed by the general rule that government cannot limit or
deny certain individual "rights" without making available a fair
procedure to determine the legality of the action. Initial focus
under the procedural approach is on the nature, rather than the
weight, of the individual interest involved. Consistent with its
substantive approach, however, the Supreme Court has generally
treated governmental infringement of a fundamental right as a
per se violation of due process and has not considered the form
of the procedures followed.78In cases where the interests in "life,
liberty, or property" fall short of being "fundamental" but are
nevertheless proteqted by the due process clause, analysis has
turned to the additional questions of what process was due
under the particular circumstances of each case and whether
76. The Court further stated that even if the need for an advance hearing had been
clear under the facts of the case, the administrative burden of providing such hearing
would of itself weigh heavily against requiring it. Id. at 680-81.
77. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U S . 593, 597 (1972).
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that process or an equivalent one was provided. Only when sufficient safeguards have not been provided in some form is there
properly a breach of the due process guarantee and an actionable violation of a constitutional right."
11. White's APPROACH:
FARFROMUNITED
The complaint in White u. RoehfordsOcharged the defendant police officers with violations of constitutional rights under
three principal headings: (1) interference with a right to interstate travel; (2) interference with a right to liberty and to family
integrity; and (3) interference with a right to freedom from intimidation and coer~ion.~'
However, since much of the Seventh
Circuit's attention was focused on classifying the officers' omissive actions as gross or reckless negligence for purposes of liability under section 1983P only a portion of the short opinion was
devoted to a discussion of the nature of the due process violation
involved.
Aside from an indication in the concurring opinion that procedural issues were considered by the court to be irrelevant to
the circumstances of this case,'" the court did not identify the
due process framework applied in its analysis. It simply announced that the plaintiffs had been denied due process based
on two grounds: (1)that "chief among [the liberty interests protected by the due process clause] is the right to some degree of
~ that this right was intruded upon by the
bodily i n t e g r i t ~ "and
police officers' "unjustified" refusal to lend aid to the children;86
79. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.at 682.
80. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 389; see Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Appellees' Brief at 3, White v.
Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
82. A continuing difference of opinion exists among the circuits as to the requisite
level of negligence necessary to bring unintentional acts within the realm of deprivations
of constitutional rights actionable under 5 1983. The Seventh Circuit's apparent concern
in the instant case for qualifying the level of negligence descriptive of the policemen's
actions was because of its earlier adoption of a "reckless disregard" standard in this
context. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this
search for a standard of conduct under 5 1983, see Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U . PA. L. REV. 533 (1978);
Note, Section 1983 Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB.L. REV.271 (1978).
83. 592 F.2d at 387 n.2 (Tone, J., concurring). Judge Tone indicated that questions
of procedure were irrelevant because it was not the failure to provide adequate process
before leaving the children on the highway that was complained of; rather, it was the
unjustified interference with personal security.
84. Id. at 383.
85. Id.
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and (2) that, even though no physical force was used, the police
officers' conduct was such as to "shock the conscience" and thus
alone violated due process.s6 The court also described a possible
third ground-that a protected interest in the "integrity of the
parent-child relationship" was harmed by depriving the children
of adult care-but relegated discussion of that deprivation to a
footnote.87
The dissentss asserted that the cases cited by the court "[iln
no way . . . support appellants' principal claims that they were
deprived of their constitutional rights to liberty, non-interference with family affairs or freedom to travel in interstate commer~e."~@
Apart from this criticism, the dissent's major contention was that there was no stated cause for liability because
there was no showing of proximate cause or breach of any affirmative duty by the policemen to render assistance to the
children?"

As one Supreme Court Justice has observed, "The decision
of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria."@lAlthough
many of the "principles and criteria" that provide contour to the
due process guarantee are admittedly imprecise, the courts have
not been left to make decisions without direction. Even so, striking inconsistencies exist between the general guidelines offered
by Supreme Court due process decisions and the Seventh Circuit's analysis in White v. Rochford.

A. The Apparent Rationale of White v. Rochford
The Seventh Circuit's failure to consider procedural issues
in White indicates that it based its decision on what it considered to be purely substantive protections of the due process
clause. This presumption is buttressed by the court's unqualified
acceptance of the only two specific rights described at any
length in its decision: "Not only does the Due Process Clause
86. Id. at 385.
87. Id. at 383 n.1.
88. The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Kilkenny, Senior Circuit Judge for
the Ninth Circuit, sitting on the court by designation.
89. 592 F.2d at 390 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 392-93.
91. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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restrain [I] undue incursions on personal security, but also it restrains [2] state activities which are fundamentally offensive to
'a sense of justice' or which 'shock the conscience.' "@2 Since the
court reversed the district court's decision on the grounds that
at least these two "substantive rights" were affected, the best
method for examining its reasoning is to independently test
these identified rights and the Seventh Circuit's substantive
analysis.
I . Rational basis and unjustified incursion

It is unclear whether the constitutional breach identified by
the court in White was a deprivation of a protectible liberty interest coupled with a failure to meet a rational basis requirement, or a violation of an independent and fundamental right to
be free from all undue intrusions on personal security. Under
either interpretation, however, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
departed from the norm set by Supreme Court decisions.
The proposition that the court applied at least some form of
rational basis test in White is supported by the court's conclusory description of the officers' refusal to take the children
In an earlier case,
into custody as "arbitrary" or "unju~tified."@~
Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District," the Seventh Circuit described substantive due process and rational basis in similar terms:
The claim that a person is entitled to "substantive due process" means, as we understand the concept, that state action
which deprives him of life, liberty, or property must have a rational basis-that is to say, the reason for the deprivation may
not be so inadequate that the judiciary will characterize it as
"arbitr~ry.'*~

Using this concept as an overlay to the White opinion helps explain the court's failure to focus specifically on the presence or
absence of a reasonable connection between the intrusion and a
legitimate governmental end. The Seventh Circuit in effect ruled
that there was no rational basis for the police officers' actions in
this case by labeling those actions "arbitrary;" consequently, the
92. 592 F.2d at 383 (emphasis added).
93. Id. The appellants' brief also specifically argued that no reasonable basis existed
for the appellees' conduct. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9.
94. 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
95. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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court only had to describe the results in terms of effects on a
protectible interest in life, liberty, or property to find a violation
of the due process clause.96This requirement was in turn met by
holding that the officers' negligence infringed on a liberty interest in bodily integrity and physical security."
Although a form of the rational basis test was adaptable to
the facts in White, the underlying question remains whether
that due process test was proper under the circumstances, i.e.,
whether the court was correct in its tacit assumption that any
deprivation of a protectible liberty interest by means it could
characterize as "arbitrary" or "unjustified" violated a right to
substantive due process.
In its own discussion of the rational basis test, the Supreme
Court has never expressly limited its application to the examination of statutes or other regulatory actions of state instruments.
It is reasonable to conclude, however, that such a limitation inheres in the very history and nature of the approach itself, that
it is thus an inappropriate due process test for nonlegislative activity, and therefore improperly applied in this case.
The rational basis measuring stick was not created by the
Court to resolve due process challenges to all state actions and
activities. It was formulated instead to test the validity of legislative enactments and to check the exercise of the State's lawmaking power, which it was feared normal procedural requirements could not effectively limit.98 Even within this limited
target area, the rational basis test is of questionable continued
validity; it seems to have buckled beneath the weight of judicial
deference to the states' exercise of their own powers. Not only
did varying standards of "irrationality" and "arbitrariness"
under the traditional substantive approach generate serious criticism? but the use today of the rational basis test by the Su96. The Jeffriesopinion recognized that a lack of rational basis must always be tied
to a recognizable right to "life, liberty or property7'-that there is not an independent
due process right to "freedom from arbitrariness." 492 F.2d at 4 n.8.
97. It is ironic that the concept of liberty could be thus interpreted to include both a
right not to be taken into another's physical custody and the right to be taken into
physical custody. This dilemma is not resolved by the court's focus on the facts of resulting emotional and physical injury.
98. The plaintiffs in White did not challenge any sort of statute, rule, or regulation.
Their complaint was of police negligence in failing to act.
99. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.L. REV. 693
(1976).
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preme Court is virtually a signal of state victory.loOThis does
not mean that due process protection from legislative action infringing nonfundamental rights is no longer available; rather, the
protection is couched in terms of procedural, rather than substantive, rights and limitations.1°1
These doctrinal and practical bounds to the rational basis
analysis were seemingly ignored by the Seventh Circuit in
White. The discretionary actions of police officers, regardless of
how wisely exercised in specific instances, are among the various
forms of governmental activity that fall outside the raison d'gtre
of the substantive approach because they may be effectively controlled and their abuse deterred by procedural methods.lo2
The Seventh Circuit's use of a rational basis substantive
test in this case was thus laid on a false foundation. Alone this
error might have been harmless, but its impact was compounded
by the court's analysis. Not only did the approach attach undue
weight to the personal interests involved, but it failed to account
for the practical and usually deferential position the Supreme
Court has taken toward state action under a rational basis due
process examination. In Kelley v. Johnson,los for example, the
100. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Through these cases flows a common thread of emphasis that ready invalidation of
state activities under the due process clause may not be compatible with maintenance of
state autonomy in our federal system. The Court has noted the following: "We must
accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day
adminstration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review of every such error." Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341,349-50 (1976). In a similar vein, the Court in Meachum observed that interpretation
of the dub process clause should not "involve the judiciary in issues and discretionary
decisions that are not the business of federal judges." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. a t 22829. See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAW. L. REV.489, 502-03 (1977).
101. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur the
Supreme Court carefully avoided the substantive label in invalidating a school board rule
under the due process clause. It instead applied a procedural standard and found the
rule lacking.
102. This is especially true if sanctions are imposed for breach of those requirements. One such sanction, the exclusionary rule, renders evidence obtained by "unreasonable searches and seizures" inadmissible a t trial. On the subject of sanctions, discipline and police misconduct in general, see Brent, Redress of Alleged Police Misconduct:
A New Approach to Citizen Complaints and Police Disciplinary Procedures, 11 U.S.F.
L. REV.587 (1977).
103. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). This case involved a challenge to a county police regulation establishing a mandatory hair grooming policy for the police force.
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Supreme Court placed the burden upon the party making a substantive due process challenge to show the absence of any rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate state
end.lo4 The Seventh Circuit in White effectively ignored any
such presumption of constitutionality. By independently classifying the defendant officers' behavior as grossly negligent, the
court placed upon them the burden of demonstrating any reasonable justification for their actions.lo5This effective presumption of unconstitutionality could not be overcome because the
defendants' admission of facts in the complaint was required in
order to make a motion to dismiss.lo6 The outcome thus departed from the deferential position taken by the Supreme
Court. In Kelley the Court held that the district court's original
dismissal following the motion was justified.lo7In White, by contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's dismissal
for failure to state a constitutional claim was in error.lo8
2. Strict scrutiny and fundamental rights

Certain aspects of the analysis in White u. Rochford appear
to be based on a higher standard of review than that normally
applied in the rational basis context. It will be recalled that
under either the "modern" substantive approach or a purely
procedural due process analysis, the deprivation of a right the
Court has labeled as "fundamental" is usually treated as a per
se denial of due process.lWThis is effected under what has been
104. Id. at 247. The Court was willing to assume that the right to wear one's own
hair at a length of one's own choosing might be a protectible aspect of liberty, but held
that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing that no rational basis supported
regulation of the length of policemen's hair.
105. The Court placed great weight on its conclusion that there was simply no apparent justification, 592 F.2d at 3&1; yet it did so without considering possible reasons
for the policemen's refusal to take the children with them in the patrol car. The court
also did not openly consider the possible relevance to the policemen's decision of the fact
that one of the "children" was actually sixteen years old, Appellee's Brief at 6.
106. 592 F.2d at 382. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of
facts as true. See Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. v. City of Indian Rocks Beach, 434
F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 1970).
107. 425 U.S. at 249.
108. 592 F.2d at 382.
109. A substantive due process analysis of a nonlegislative infringement of even
fundamental rights is technically open to the same doctrinal criticism as the rational
basis approach discussed in the text accompanying note 98 supra. Nonetheless, since the
identification of the nature of an affected interest is part of the procedural approach, and
since the very definition of fundamental rights precludes any substantial interference by
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termed "strict judical scrutiny9'-a method of review that places
upon the state the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest or necessity to justify any substantial deprivation of a protected personal right.l1° The question thus becomes whether a
fundamental interest was involved under the facts of this case.
The complaint in White specifically alleged interference
with a right to travel interstate, which has been labeled "fundamental" by the Supreme Court,ll1 but the Seventh Circuit did
not address that contention in its opinion.l12 An argument that
the action interfered with a right to family integrity was also
raised, but the court mentioned it only in a footnote-an indication of an unwillingness to view this particular interest as a fundamental right under the facts.llS However, the court did attach
some importance in context to a right to physical security.
a. Fundamental interest in personal security? The Sev--

-

-

-

--

government authority, regardless of procedure, the practical results of a procedural over
a substantive analysis in this area are often indistinguishable.
110. Just as "rational basis" generally signals state victory, standards of strict scrutiny and compelling state interest usually mean victory for the individual since the
courts invariably can suggest a less burdensome alternative to the action taken by the
state. The concurring opinion in White spoke specifically of necessity: "Unnecessarily
endangering the innocent parties in reckless disregard of their safety . . . constituted an
unjustifiable intrusion on their federally protected rights." 592 F.2d at 388 (Tone, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). The concurring opinion also suggested alternatives. Id. a t
n.3.
111. See cases cited note 38 supra.
112. Only the dissent touched on this particular argument:
The fact that the minors were left unattended and were forced to cross the
dangerous Skyway does not bootstrap the officers' arrest and detention of
DeGeorge into a violation of appellants' constitutional right to travel in interstate commerce. . . . If there was interference with appellants' right to travel
in interstate commerce, that action was supplied by their uncle in failing to
obey the law.
F.2d a t 389.
113. Id. at 383 n.1. Although the court did not refer specifically to a fundamental
right to family integrity, it did refer to cases cited by the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to support the notion of fundamental penumbral rights
relating to marriage and sexual relationships. From these cases, however, the White
opinion distilled what it felt was another common strain-"a particular emphasis by the
Due Process Clause on the integrity of the parent-child relationship." 592 F.2d at 383
n.1. If by this reference the court wished to suggest that a fundamental right was
breached by the temporary separation between parent and child that occurred in this
case, it does not so specify. The court only suggested that "[ilt is difficult to believe that
this [parent-child] relationship is any less harmed by depriving children of adult care
and stranding them on a freeway than by controlling school curricula." Id. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. a t 482, which suggests that Meyer u. Nebraska and Pierce
u. Society of Sisters did not survive the post-Lochner demise of substantive due process
because of a particular concern for family solidarity, but only because of close ties to first
amendment rights of religion and speech.
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enth Circuit's inclusion of an interest in personal security or a
"right to some degree of bodily integrity"l14 within the scope of
"liberty" protected by the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment is adequately supported. However, this right,
like freedom from physical restraint, has not been granted the
same level of immunity from government incursion as have, for
example, the specific first amendment rights regarding speech
and religion.l16 Incursion on personal security alone would therefore not constitute the per se violation of due process seemingly
identified in White. The Seventh Circuit instead described an
independent and apparently fundamental right to be free from
unjustified intrusions on personal security.l16
Support for such a position can be found under virtually
identical language in cases cited in the White opinion, but there
are important differences in underlying rationale. In Jenkins u.
Averett,l17 for example, the Fourth Circuit recognized a right to
personal security and found it infringed by reckless conduct resulting in injury to another. However, that case involved the
pursuit and arrest of a suspect; the Fourth Circuit tied the suspect's "right to be free from arbitrary intrusions on personal security" to the specific and fundamental fourth amendment
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.l18 By comparison, no fourth amendment deprivation was alleged by the plaintiffs or suggested by the Seventh Circuit in White."@
The White opinion also quoted language from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ingraham v. Wright120 suggesting that a right
to physical security actually exists independent of the fourth
amendment. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the Ingraham Court
spoke of an historic liberty in the "right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal se114. 592 F.2d at 383.
115. The deprivation of physical liberty by arrest, for instance, does not trigger
strict judicial scrutiny even when warrants, which are normally required are not obtained. Physical freedom is still protected, of course, but by procedural, not substantive,
controls. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. a t 679-80 (citing United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
116. 592 F.2d at 383 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. at 673).
117. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
118. Id. a t 1232. This rationale, as was recognized in the concurring opinion in
White, is one commonly followed in excessive force cases. 592 F.2d a t 387.
119. The court did not address any fourth amendment considerations, not even in
terms of labeling the uncle's arrest "unreasonable" because of its effect on the children.
120. 430 US. 651 (1977).
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curity."lal This phrase, however, was quoted out of context and
is therefore misleading. The more complete quotation, acknowledged by the concurring opinion in White,lP2reveals that the
Supreme Court did not refer to such a right in absolute terms
and did not imply, as the majority opinion in White seemed to
suggest, that infringement alone would violate a substantive
guarantee of due process. Ingraham identified this right to be
free from unjustified intrusions on personal security as a "liberty
preserved from deprivation without due process."12s It seems
anomalous to conclude that the same element-freedom from
unjustified actions-should entitle a person to due process and
at the same time be a part of the process due.
b. The Rochin test. While there may be doubt as to the
position the Seventh Circuit took toward the children's right to
liberty, the alternate thrust of its opinion was absolute. It identified an unqualified right to be free from any "state activities
which are fundamentally offensive to 'a sense of justice' or which
'shock the conscience!"'124 If by the use of this language the
court meant to suggest that Rochin u. Californiala6established a
fundamental substantive right, it did so only by an overly broad
reading of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in that case.
Rochin was not a substantive due process case at all. Its rationale and holding dealt strictly with the procedural guarantees
of the due process clause; the "shocks the conscience" test, to
which the Rochin decision gave birth, had nothing whatsoever to
do with defining an independent and absolute right, as the court
in White apparently assumed. The liberty interest a t stake in
Rochin was liberty in its classical sense. It was an interest in
freedom from physical restraint, a freedom deprived in that case
as a result of criminal conviction and incarceration. The Rochin
opinion was simply addressed to the question of whether the
conviction was obtained by methods satisfying "due process of
law." The specific inquiry centered on the methods used to ob121. 592 F.2d at 383 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. at 673). The opinion
also noted that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, that an individual's reputation is not protected by the due process clause, "can be construed as retreating from the position that an individual's right to be free from physical and emotional well-being is protected by the substantive guarantees of that clause." 592 F.2d at
386.
122. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
123. 430 US. at 673.
124. 592 F.2d at 383 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165, 172-73 (1952)).
125. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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tain the evidence leading to the defendant's conviction and imIn Justice Frankfurter's own words: "The propris~nment.~'~
ceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience."127
Had Rochin been decided after later Supreme Court rulings
that applied the limitations of the exclusionary rule to the
states,"' or after the right of privacy cases,lZ9it presumably
could have been based on purely substantive grounds. But it was
not, and it is inconsistent with its true rationale to draw from its
language a fundamental substantive right independent from the
facts of the case. As the Court stated in Rochin: "The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We
may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function."lsO

B. What the Court Missed
It is interesting that the court in White relied upon Ingraham u. WrightlS1to demonstrate the existence of a right to personal security, but saw no need under the facts before it to follow Ingraham's procedural analysis. It is this procedural
approach that is normally followed when an affected right,
though protectible, is less than fundamental.lS2Ingraham noted
that although there is a right to personal security or even a right
126. This well-known case involved a complaint that a criminal defendant's conviction was the result of the admission of evidence obtained in violation of due process. The
contested evidence was two capsules containing morphine that were obtained by state
narcotics agents who had broken into the defendent's bedroom and had observed him
take the capsules from a nightstand near his bed and put them into his mouth. When the
agents could not retrieve the capsules by prying the defendant's month open, they had
his stomach "pumped" against his will. The Supreme Court termed the admission of the
evidence the equivalent of a coerced confession obtained by means "too close to the rack
and screw" to be ignored. Id. at 172.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
129. See, e.g., the "privacy in the marital bedroom" language in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
130. 342 U.S. at 170.
131. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
132. The right to education, for example, though a recognized right in a greater definition of liberty, is not a fundamental one. Thus, even though a deprivation of the right
to attend school requires the satisfaction of certain procedural guarantees, Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975), it does not of itself "substantively" violate the due process clause.
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against unjustified intrusion upon physical security as a part of
an individual's right to liberty, identification of this right in a
particular instance is not of itself sufficient to answer the due
process question.1ss The Seventh Circuit, however, did not proceed in its analysis beyond the point where it determined that
this right to physical security had been affected. It essentially
held that this deprivation was alone sufficient to create a cause
of action under section 1983.
Because many due process claims are based upon specific
Bill of Rights guarantees that have been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment, the two-tiered procedural analysis frequently may be unnecessary. But the Supreme Court did find
the procedural questions necessary in Ingraham. The White
court's failure to follow 'suit, even though it relied heavily upon
Ingraham to identify a protectible right, implies that it overlooked a portion of the analysis necessary to actually identify a
breach of the due process clause.lS4
The determination of what process is due under the circumstances of a particular case is strictly a matter of judicial balancing.lS5There are thus no established rules that would mandate
an outcome different from that arrived at by the Seventh Circuit's particular form of nonprocedural analysis in this case.
Nevertheless, several important factors were not granted proper
weight or consideration in White v. Rochford. Principal among
these was the underlying nature of the circumstances and alleged violations of the case. The court also failed to consider the
possibilities of extraconstitutional common law or administrative
remedies for the injuries claimed.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Paul v. Davisls6contained
language critical of interpretations and beliefs that "would make
of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by
the states."ls7 It noted that "it would come as a great surprise to
133. 430 U.S.at 673-74.
134. It is immaterial that the complaint was not leveled specifically at failure to
provide adequate notice and hearing prior to leaving the children in the car. If simple
failure to allege inadequate procedure made procedural questions irrelevant, plaintiffs
could successfully avoid Ingraham and similar precedents altogether.
135. The relative weight given to each factor described at text acompanying note 72
supra, is determined by the court under the facts of each particular case. They are
neither preweighed nor prebalanced.
136. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
137. Id. at 701.
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those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amendment to learn that it worked such a result."ls8 The Paul Court
responded to a tendency toward undue expansion of the due
process cause of action by placing limits upon the scope of protected "liberty."
Though the ultimate solutions were different from those
adopted in Paul, the Court's concern for appropriate limits to
due process action was again evidenced in its later decision in
Ingraham. There the Court admitted that a protectible liberty
interest was at stake, but reasoned that the fourteenth amendment did not proscribe all deprivations or incursions on that interest-only those deprivations without due process. It thus rejected student claims that the process due had not been afforded
when corporal punishment was administered without opportunity for a prior hearing. Because in the Court's view there was
suflicient force in proceedings available under the state's common tort laws to remedy any unjustified punishments and to
generally deter abuse, no additional safeguards were constitutionally required. A deprivation had occurred, but it was with,
not without, due process.lS@
Just as Florida common law allowed tort actions against
teachers for abuse of their authority to discipline children-a
fact of which Ingraham took special n~ticel~~-Illinois
law relevant to the circumstances in White provides an established basis
of police liability for abuse of their particular duties."' Both
138. Id. at 699. See also Baker v. McCollan, 433 U.S. 137 (1979). Baker was decided
by the Supreme Court after the Seventh Circuit's decision in White, but it reinforces the
observation that the Supreme Court is concerned with federal court inroads into state
tort law. The allegation in Baker was that the failure of a sheriPs office to exercise
reasonable care to ascertain the true identity of an arrested individual, and the detention
of that individual over his protests for several days before the error was discovered,
amounted to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
The Court, however, made it clear that "[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising
out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under
traditional tort-law principles. . . . [Flalse imprisonment does not become a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official." Id. at 126.
139. The due process clause does not guarantee unqualified enjoyment of life, liberty, or property. It only prdects against governmental deprivations of those personal
interests without due process.
140. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 677.
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gallatin Cty., 418 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1969). The court there
recognized that under Illinois law a policeman can be held liable for negligence that
proximately causes injury to a third person, even if the negligent act is committed in
performance of the policeman's duty. See also Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge, 71
Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966); Andrews v. Porter, 70 Ill. App. 2d 202, 217
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state tort law and applicable criminal provisions142were referenced by the Seventh Circuit in its opinion, but only to support
its position that the policemen were under an affirmative duty to
aid the children.14' No weight a t all was given to either aspect of
state law in determining whether there was a lack of necessary
process. It is difficult to rationalize this incomplete use of the
Ingraham approach, especially against the backdrop of voiced
Supreme Court concern for possible encroachment by the federal courts, under the guise of the fourteenth amendment, into
areas traditionally covered by state laws."'

C. Implications of the White Decision: An Emotional Gloss
on the Due Process Guarantee
The court's narrow holding in White v. Rochford is less disturbing than its supporting rationale, perhaps because the court
did not articulate ita exact reasons for drawing the conclusions it
did. The fact that no clear precedent supports the Seventh Circuit's uniquely substantive analysis of the type of actions alleged
in the case, coupled with the court's refusal to even acknowledge
the Ingraham rationale, raises the question whether the opinion
was more an emotional reaction than a true due process
analysis.146
This tendency toward judicial subjectivity is the very tendency that engendered the greatest criticisms against the openendedness of the substantive due process analysis during the
early decades of this century.14@
It has no doubt also been instrumental in more recent Supreme Court efforts to darken an everfading line between the moral responsibilities commonly governed by state statutes, tradition, or common law, and the narN.E.2d 305 (1966), aff'dsub nom. Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d
597 (1967).
142. ILL.REV.STAT.ch. 23, 5 2368 (1973) (prohibiting willful abandonment of children to the elements).
143. 592 F.2d at 384.
144. See notes 137-139 and accompnying text supra. See also Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAW. L. REV.1 (1959).
145. "It is difficult to understand how conduct so clearly deserving of universal reprobation can be said to fall outside the protections of the Due Process Clause . . . . " 592
F.2d at 386.
146. "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opitlions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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rower, more basic constitutional rules that establish only minimum standards of legitimate government conduct.
White v. Rochford is unique in its approach, even as it is
unique in its facts.14' Time alone will determine whether the
vague contours and multiple facets of the court's reasoning will
help or hinder the decision's precedential value. While interesting theories may be distilled from it, it will probably only serve
as an example of how difficult it is for the judiciary to rid itself
of the biases of tort philosophy and to be objective when faced
with a purely constitutional challenge, even though the facts
may arouse moral sensitivities.

IV. CONCLUSION:
A CONSTITUTIONAL
MISSTEP
In White v. Rochford, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
the offending policemen had deprived the plaintiff children of
constitutional rights seem to follow emotional impulses more
closely than it follows acceptable principles of due process analysis. The court gave only incomplete reference to appropriate
case law, it refused to consider even the relevance of procedural
questions, and it failed to note the special relevance that the recent Supreme Court decision in Ingraham v. Wright gave to the
availability of independent causes of action under Illinois law. In
so doing, the court successfully, even if perhaps not purposefully, avoided the balancing that has been commonly used to resolve due process conflicts between nonlegislative state action
and constitutionally protected, but less than fundamental, personal interests.
The White decision's uniquely substantive approach to the
due process issue evidences only an attempt to arrive at a "just"
result based on the appellate court's independent evaluation of
the officers' alleged actions. The final judicial product is one that
is blatantly inconsistent with evident Supreme Court policy that
the due process clause is not a valid source of general federal
tort liability. If the Seventh Circuit had good reasons to circumvent this policy, it could have masked its efforts more effectively. The holding in White could have been at least more
clearly reasoned, even if not more solidly based, had it been decided on grounds of procedural insufficiency in the police officers' actions.
147. The dissent noted that the court "citkd to no Civil Rights Act authority, and [it
found] none, which [was]even closely akin factually" to this case. 592 F.2d at 389.
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Substantive due process analysis has not disappeared from
judicial decision making, but the trend, which should continue,
has been to carefully limit its scope. Courts that are inclined to
adopt a purely substantive approach toward nonregulatory types
of state action similar to that challenged in White should first
insure that the rights involved are within the scope of "fundamentals" that find solid root in specific constitutional language
or values. The Seventh Circuit's failure to do so in White u.
Rochford resulted in an obviously superficial analysis, wanting
for necessary procedural considerations and balance.
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